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FOUR SEASONS PROPERTIES, 
a Utah limited partnership, 
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THOMAS D. ELLIOT, Trustee for 
FRONTIER PROPERTIES, INC., 
a California corporation, et al, 
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REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The salient issue presented in this case is whether or 
not the trial court's findings and Judgment are supported by 
substantial evidence. Peripherally related to this issue, are 
questions of whether or not the trial court correctly found that 
Healy was not an agent of Four Seasons and, whether or not the 
trial court utilized the appropriate measure of damage in this 
case, which involved a breach of land sale contract. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case involves an appeal from a Judgment entered in 
favor of plaintiff and against defendant/appellant, Thomas D. 
Elliot, Trustee for Frontier Properties, Inc., a California 
corporation (hereinafter referred to as "Trustee"). [R.1921,1833] 
Plaintiff, Four Seasons Properties, is a Utah limited 
partnership (hereinafter referred to as "Four Seasons11) organized 
and existing under the laws of the State of Utah. [R.1921] 
On November 15, 1979, Four Seasons, by and through its 
partners, sold to defendant, Frontier Properties, Inc., 
(hereinafter referred to as "Frontier11) certain real property in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, [R.1922], for the sum of 
$2,100,000.00 as per the Uniform Real Estate Contract dated the 
15th day of November, 1979. [R.1922, Exhibit IP] 
Pursuant to the terms of the contract, Frontier paid to 
Four Seasons during the first year certain payments totalling 
$500,000.00 with the balance of the contract to be paid in 
monthly installments of $14,041.13 at 10% interest commencing on 
December 1, 1979. [R.1922-1923] 
At the time of the sale of the subject property, there 
was a balance due and owing, pursuant to the mortgage placed on 
the property by Lincoln Savings (hereinafter referred to as 
"Lincoln'1) in the amount of $901,000.00. [R.1923] 
There was also a Note and a Trust Deed by Earnest H. 
Coleman and Violet V. Coleman (hereinafter referred to as 
"Colemans"), on the subject property in the original amount of 
$50,000.00, with approximately $41,000.00 still due and owing at 
the time Frontier purchased the subject property. [R.1923] 
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On or about June 8, 1979, a third Deed of Trust was 
placed on the subject property in favor of the Lockhart Company 
(hereinafter referred to as "Lockhart") in the amount of 
$83,000.00. [R.1923] 
Subsequent to the execution of the real estate contract 
on November 15, 1979, Four Seasons placed another obligation in 
the amount of $390,000.00 on the subject property in favor of 
Zions First National Bank of Salt Lake City, (hereinafter 
referred to as "Zions"). [R.1923] 
On or about August 17, 1981, Frontier filed a Chapter 
11 bankruptcy proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court 
for the Southern District of California, Case No. C81-1177-K, in 
San Diego, California. [R.1833, 1924] 
During the month of November, 1981, a series of 
hearings was held in the bankruptcy court in which Four Seasons 
attempted to persuade Trustee that no equity existed in the 
subject property. Following a series of negotiations, a 
stipulation [Trial Exhibit 22P] was entered into between the 
parties. Under the terms of this Stipulation, Trustee was given 
the right to assume or reject the real estate contract. [R.1924] 
After electing to assume said contract on January 22, 1982, the 
Trustee had until July 22, 1982, to cure all defaults. The 
Stipulation also provided that if Trustee failed to cure all 
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defaults the automatic stay of the bankruptcy court as to said 
contract would then be lifted. [R.1924] 
Between January 22, 1982, and July 22, 1982, Trustee 
attempted to sell the subject property. [F.1925] Thereafter, 
Four Seasons tried diligently to market the subject property. 
Four Seasons kept in contact with Trustee because the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract had been recorded, and hence was a cloud on 
the title and an encumberance on the subject property. [R.1925] 
These endeavors to sell the subject property failed for 
various reasons, some due to Trustee's action, Lincoln's demand 
that the rate of interest be increased because of a provision of 
their note and mortgage, Trustee's demand to make a profit on the 
transaction, and Trustee's failure to communicate offers to Four 
Seasons. [R.1833, 1925] 
On October 1, 1982, both Lincoln and Colemans obtained 
a relief from the stay order of the United States Bankruptcy 
Court of the Southern District of California. [R.1925] 
Lincoln immediately commenced foreclosure proceedings 
and the subject property was set for mortgage foreclosure sale on 
May 24, 1983. [R.1925] 
On October 8, 1982, the Colemans filed a notice of 
default on their Trust Note and the Trustee's sale on the 
Colemans Trust Deed was set for February 22, 1983. [R.1834, 1926] 
-4-
Thereafter, on January 12, 1983, the Colemans duly 
assigned their note to Fred Healy (hereinafter referred to as 
"Healy") for the unpaid balance. [R.1834, 1926] 
Healy, on February 22, 1983, personally purchased and 
acquired the subject property at the sherifffs sale pursuant to 
Trial Exhibits 32P and 33P by bidding the amount of his own debt. 
[R.1834, 1926] Prior to the sale, Trustee had been given proper 
notice and was aware of the time and date set for such sale. 
[R.1926] At the time of the sale, the subject property was 
encumbered in the amount of $1,504,817.88. [R.1834, 1928] After 
purchasing the subject property, Healy, who was a partner with 
John Prince, a local businessman in the Salt Lake area, was 
unsuccessful in his efforts to market the subject property. 
[R.1926] 
Healy, in addition to his general work of buying and 
selling real estate, was also an appraiser. He had dealt in the 
real estate market, and with properties of similar nature as the 
subject property, in the Salt Lake area for a long time. There-
fore, Healy was well qualified to give an opinion concerning the 
value of the subject property. In his opinion, the subject 
property had a fair market value of $1,550,000.00 as of February 
22, 1983. This opinion was based upon Healyfs expertise in the 
real estate market, high interest rates, changes in the real 
estate market, and his thorough familiarity with all of the 
aspects of the subject property. [R.1927] 
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Jesse F. Cannon, as a general partner of Four Seasons 
had also been buying and purchasing real estate in the Salt Lake 
market for a long time and was well acquainted with properties 
with similar characteristics as the subject property. Mr. Cannon 
testified that in his opinion, the subject property, on February 
22, 1983, had a fair market value of $1,550,000.00. [R.1927] 
Based on the uncontradicted opinions of Healy and Mr. 
Cannon, the court found that the fair market value of the 
property as of February 22, 1983, was $1,550,000.00. [R.1927] 
Prior to February 22, 1983, Zion and Lockhart informed 
Healy that the sheriff's sale set for February 22, 1983, of the 
Colemans Trust Deed would impair their security and they would 
not allow him to be the successful bidder at the sale in order to 
protect their Trust Deeds. Therefore, Healy signed subordination 
agreements with Lockhart and Zion as to the Colemans Trust Deed 
Note and Mortgage. [F.1927] 
Prior to the date of the foreclosure of the Lincoln 
mortgage, on May 24, 1982, Zion and Lockhart notified Jesse F. 
Cannon and Thomas Q. Cannon that they were not going to redeem 
Lincoln1s mortgage. Instead they would hold the Cannons to their 
obligation under the Cannons personal signatures as general 
partners. Thereafter, on May 24, 1983, Jesse F. Cannon and 
Thomas Q. Cannon personally purchased the subject property from 
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Healy for approximately $41,000.00 subject to the existing Notes, 
Trust Deeds and encumberances on the subject property. 
[R.1927-1928] 
Healy acquired the property in an arms-length 
transaction at a foreclosure sale which was duly advertised and 
notice was given generally in a manner provided for Trustee's 
sales. Furthermore, notice was given to the Trustee personally, 
who duly acknowledged that in open court. [R.1834,1928] Hence, 
Trustee had adequate opportunity, if he so desired, to arrange 
for other purchasers or to bid on the subject property himself. 
[R.1928] 
The further sale of the subject property by Healy to 
the Cannons was another arms-length transaction. The Cannons 
paid good and valuable consideration to Healy and personally 
acquired the subject property. [R.1928] This personal acquisi-
tion of the subject property, however, does not affect the right 
and the cause of action for damages that Four Seasons has against 
Frontier. [R.1928] 
The Trustee's rejection of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract, after assuming the same, constituted a breach which was 
recognized by the United States Bankruptcy Court. Said court, in 
an order entered June 30, 1983, specifically held as follows: 
"2. . . . Accordingly, the damages suffered by 
Four Seasons Properties, if any, arising out of 
the breach of the land sale contract, constitutes 
an administrative priority claim against the State 
of Frontier Properties, Inc." [R.1929,Exhibit 36P] 
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On the date of the sheriff's sale, the parties 
stipulated that the balance due and owing by Frontier to Four 
Seasons under the Uniform Real Estate Contract, executed on 
November 15, 1979, was $1,749,950.32. The parties further 
stipulated that the indebtedness on the outstanding mortgages and 
Trust Deeds was $1,504,817.88. [R.1929] 
An order issued by the United States Bankruptcy Court 
for the Southern District of California on June 16, 1983, 
pursuant to Trial Exhibit 36P, provided as follows: 
"1. The Trustee's motion to reject the executory 
land sale contract entered into between the 
debtor, Frontier Properties, Inc., and Four 
Seasons Properties, which had been assumed on 
January 22, 1982, by election of the Trustee in 
accordance with the terms of a stipulation between 
the parties is hereby denied insofar as the 
Trustee attends, through his motion, to have his 
rejection and the consequences of the land sale 
contract take effect as cf the date the order for 
relief in these bankruptcy cases were entered. 
f!2. The Trustee's motion to reject the previously 
assumed land sale contract constitutes a rejection 
governed by 11 U.S.C. §365(g)(2) and (A) and, 
therefore, constitutes a breach as of the date of 
the rejection, not as of the date the orders for 
relief in these bankruptcy cases were entered. 
. . ." [R.1930] 
On August 6, 1983, Four Seasons, pursuant to paragraph 
16(c) of the Uniform Real Estate Contract, made an election to 
treat said contract as a note and mortgage as set forth in said 
paragraph. But the subject property was sold under the terms and 
conditions as provided for in the Colemans Trust Note and Deed on 
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February 22, 1983, before Four Seasons could complete the fore-
closure action under the contract, [R.1930] Said sale of the 
subject property, pursuant to the Colemans Trust Deed and Note, 
was a direct and proximate result of Trustee's failure to make 
the payments and cure the default under the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract within six months after assuming said contract. [R.1931] 
Based upon Trustee's breach, the trial court found that 
as a result of such breach, Four Seasons lost the benefit of the 
bargain of the contract and sustained damages in the amount of 
$245,132.45. [R.1836,1931] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff contends that the trial court's findings and 
judgment were supported by substantial evidence, and therefore, 
must not be disturbed on this appeal. Plaintiff further contends 
that the trial court was correct in finding that Healy was not an 
agent of plaintiff. The trial court was also correct in 
recognizing the benefit of the bargain damages are to be awarded 
for the breach of a contract for the sale of real property. 
Finally, plaintiff contends that in his brief appellant makes 
certain arguments which are nothing more than near conclusions 




IN REVIEWING FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL 
COURT, THE SUPREME COURT MUST VIEW ALL EVIDENCE W 
LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE PREVAILING PARTY AND 
THE JUDGMENT MUST BE AFFIRMED WHfiRE THE FINDINGS 
ARE SUBSTANTIATED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
It has long been recognized by this court that a trial 
court's findings and conclusions will not be disturbed on appeal 
if supported by substantial evidence. Sine v. Salt Lake 
Transportation Company, 106 Utah 289, 147 P.2d 875-879 (1944). 
In a more recent case, Sharpe v. American Medical Systems, Inc., 
671 P.2d 185 (1983), this court stated the standard of review to 
be utilized in reviewing appeals of the kind presented by the 
instant case, as follows: 
nIn reviewing the Findings and Judgment of the 
trial court, after trial on the merits, this court 
must view the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the prevailing party, and the judgment will be 
affirmed where the Findings of Fact are substan-
tiated by the evidence." Id., at 187. 
See also Sohm v. Winegar, 565 P.2d 1134 (1977) where 
this court viewed the Findings and Judgment in the light most 
favorable to the prevailing party. First Western Fidelity v. 
Gibbons and Reed Company, 27 Utah 2d 1, 492 P.2d 132 (1971) 
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wherein this court held that it must survey the evidence in light 
most favorable to the trial court's findings. 
Applying the usual standard for review to the instant 
case, it is herewith submitted that when surveying the trial 
court's findings, and judgment in the light most favorable to 
Four Seasons, it is clear that said findings and judgment were 
supported by substantial evidence, and, therefore, must not be 
disturbed. 
POINT II 















BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO 
A MEETING OF THE MINDS 
, THE CONSENT 
IS NECESSARY TO CREATE 
OF BOTH 
AGENCY. 
One of the very basic requirements to the formation of 
an agency relationship is an agreement between the principal and 
the agent. There must be a meeting of the minds in establishing 
agency, and consent of both principal and agent is necessary. 
3 Am.Jur.2d, Agency, §17. The Restatement of The Law, 2d, 
Agency, §15 provides as follows: 
"Agency relation exists only if there has been a 
manifestation by the principal to the agent that 
the agent may act on his account, and consent by 
the agent to so act.11 
Applying these generally recognized rules of law to the 
present case, it becomes apparent that the trial court correctly 
found that l!on February 22, 1983, Healy personally purchased and 
acquired the subject property." [R.1926] The evidence presented 
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in this case supports such finding. In fact, the record in this 
case contains no evidence, either direct or circumstantial, which 
supports the Trustee's feable assertion that Healy was acting as 
an agent of Four Seasons. [Appellant's brief, page 14.] 
Four Seasons is fully aware that an agency may be 
created by estoppel, necessity or operation of law. 3 Am.Jur.2d, 
Agency, §19. Four Seasons is also aware that some courts have 
recognized the concept of implied agency. Forseyth v. Pendelton, 
617 P.2d 358, 360 (1980). True v. High-Plains Elevator 
Machinery, Inc., 577 P.2d 991 (Wyoming, 1978). In True, supra, 
plaintiff brought an action against a materialman to recover 
damages. The court in that case did recognize the existence of 
implied agency, but the court held that ffthere can be no agency 
relationship unless the factual element of control is present". 
Id. at 999. In other words, it is essential that the principal 
is in control. The Restatement of the Law 2d, Agency, §1 defines 
the essential elements of an agency relationship as follows: 
"Agency is the fiduciary relationship which 
results from the manifestation of consent by one 
person to another that the other shall act on his 
behalf subject to his control, and consent by the 
other to so act.11 True, supra, at 999. 3 Am.Jur. 
2d, Agency, §2. 
When this fundamental idea of agency is applied to the 
present case, the fallacy of Trustee's argument becomes very 
clear. In his brief, (Appellant's Brief, pp. 10-14) Trustee 
makes certain assertions by which he attempts to demonstrate how 
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Healy acted as agent of Four Seasons. These assertions are made 
despite the absence of any evidence that Four Seasons in any 
manner controlled Healy1s actions. Healy personally acquired the 
subject property at the sheriff's sale, [R.1926] and there is no 
evidence which even remotely suggests that Four Seasons 
instructed, or otherwise directed, Healy to purchase the subject 
property. 
Though Healy was acting independently, the Cannons 
nonetheless were interested in all transactions involving the 
subject property. The reason for this interest was that they 
were personally liable for the Zion and Lockhart obligations. 
[T.57 & 109, R.1927-1928] 
A further examination of the testimony presented at the 
trial will demonstrate that appellant's agency argument is 
ludicrous. Mr. Jesse F. Cannon testified that no arrangements 
were made to have Healy act as the agent of Four Seasons. [T.61] 
Healy also testified that at no time did he have any arrangement 
or agreement with Cannon to purchase the subject property. 
[T.121] Furthermore, the trial court, after careful 
consideration of all of the testimony and evidence, concluded 
that Healy personally purchased the subject property. [R.1926] 
Some of the salient testimony was that the court 
considered Mr. Healy was an associated professor in finance at 
the University of Utah, [T.117] and had done numerous appraisals 
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for Consolidated Capital, Utah Power & Light and other 
institutions. [T.117] That he originally represented the Seller 
and owner in selling the property to the respondent, Four 
Seasons, [T.119] and that he felt that he could negotiate a new 
loan through Lincoln, [T.120] and was buying the property with 
genuine, serious intentions. [T.121] His testimony of his 
genuine intention is set forth as follows: [T.121] 
Q. When you were buying the property, what were your 
intentions? 
A. Our intention -- my intention with my partner, 
John Prince, was to purchase the property or to 
dispose of it to other interested parties. I was 
presently doing that. 
Q. Is that John Prince of Prince, the stockbrokers? 
A. He is a stockbroker." 
The record then indicates that he contacted Jim Gaddis 
of Gaddis Investments, Mansell and Associates, Mark Milburn with 
Coordinated Financial Services. [T.123] From the testimony it 
became very apparent that this associate professor and real 
estate investor [T.116] independently of Mr. Cannon and Four 
Seasons Properties, had a tremendous knowledge of the property, 
and improvements and was genuinely trying to market the subject 
property for a profit and appellant failed to produce any 
evidence to the contrary. 
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It is hereby submitted that no agency relationship 
existed between Four Seasons and Healy. It is further submitted 
that there is no evidence that Four Seasons and Healy entered 
into an agency relationship, either express or implied. Nor is 
there any evidence that Four Seasons did or could have exercised 
any control over Healy in his personal acquisition of the subject 
property. Therefore, the trial court's findings, that Healy was 
not acting as Four Seasons1 agent, must be affirmed. 
POINT III 
THE BENEFIT OF THE BARGAIN DAMAGES THE PROPER 
AWARD FOR A BREACH OF CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF 
REAL PROPERTY": 
This court has long recognized the rule that benefit of 
the bargain damages are to be awarded for the breach of a 
contract for the sale of real property. Smith v. Warr, 564 P.2d 
771 (1977). In Smith, the buyer of certain real property brought 
an action for breach of contract. The Supreme Court, in 
reversing the trial court, ruled as follows: 
"The rule followed by Utah is that benefit of the 
bargain damages are to be awarded for breach of 
the contract for the sale of real estate, 
regardless of the good faith of the party in 
breach." Id. at 772. 
In a more recent case, Bitzes v. Sunset Oaks, Inc., 649 
P. 2d 66, (1982) this court again reaffirmed the benefit of the 
bargain rule as the appropriate measure of damages in case of the 
breach of contract for the sale of real property. The benefit of 
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the bargain, is "the difference between the market price and 
contract price at the time of the breach," IdL at 71. See also 
Terry v. Panek, 631 P.2d 896-897 (1981); Bradshaw v. Kersham, 627 
P.2d 528, 532 (1981) and Gardner v. Christensen, 622 P.2d 782-783 
(1980), 
When the benefit of the bargain rule, as adopted by the 
Supreme Court of Utah, is applied to the present case, it is 
apparent that the trial court judgment must be upheld. 
The soundness of the trial court's judgment is much 
more apparent when considered in the following context: 
1. On January 22, 1982, Trustee assumed the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract, dated November 15, 1979, between Four 
Seasons and Frontier. By so assuming said contract, Trustee 
stepped into the position of Frontier. [R.1924 Exhibit 4P] 
2. On June 20, 1983, the Bankruptcy Court entered an 
order denying Trustee's motion to reject the land sale contract. 
That court stated: 
"The Trustee's motion to reject the previously 
assumed land sales contract constitutes a 
rejection governed by 11 U.S.C. §365(g)(2)(A) and, 
therefore, constitutes breach as of the date of 
rejection, not as of the date the Orders for 
relief in these bankruptcy cases was entered. 
Accordingly, the damages suffered by Four Seasons 
Properties, if any, arising out of the breach of 
the land sales contract constitutes an 
administrative priority claim against the estate 
of Frontier Properties.11 [T.65, Exhibit 35] 
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3. In addition there was a Second Trust Deed on 
January 22, 1982, the date of assumption by Trustee, Lincoln had 
a first mortgage of $901,000 [T.90] with interest at 9% [Exhibit 
18] with a due-upon-sale clause, [T.34] Lincoln would not accept 
any assumption of its first mortgage as an underlying lien 
without an increase in the interest rate to 15%. [T.34] In 
addition, there was a second Trust Deed and Note of $83,000 to 
Lockhart [T.81] and a Trust Deed through Zions of $390,000. 
[T.81] The Trustee commenced, on January 22, 1982, and made 
numerous attempts to market the subject property. [Exhibit 7 21] 
The record indicates the following attempts were made to market 
the subject property by the Trustee, and also with the 




NAME OF PERSPECTIVE 
PURCHASER AMOUNT SALIENT TERM 





Offer to Purchase 
from Philip Fass 
Cunningham Utah X 
Fritz Hoelscher 
Philip Fass 
being able to 
assume underlying 
financing on terms 
satisfactory to 
Buyer. 
2,000,000 subject to existing 
debt. Requirement of 
subordinate financing 
and a 5% to 9% equity 
note on balance due. 
1,500,000 sale subject to not 
violating the 
underlying financing 









C. Reed Petersen 
Michael Madsen & 
Keith Christensen 
1,605,000 subject to not 
violating the under-
lying financing 
signed by Fassler, 
purchaser and Scott, 
Trustee 
1,775,000 signed by Petersen 
and Elliot, Trustee 
Subject to 10% 
DATE NAME OF PERSPECTIVE 
PURCHASER AMOUNT SALIENT TERM 
11/ /82 C. Reed Petersen 
Exhibit 16 Michael Madsen & 
Keith Christensen 
Counter offer by 
Elliot, Trustee 
1,710,000 assumption of 
liabilities by 
Buyer and Trust 
a net of $100,000 
12/7/82 
Exhibit 17 







count liens and Buye 
to obtain approval 
of underlying 
financing, signed 
by Elliot, Trustee 
1,560,000 signed by Thomas 
Elliot, subject 
subject to the 
purchaser obtaining 
an agreement of the 
underlying lien 
to discount the 
balances and the 
underlying lien 
holders accepting 
the terms and condi-
tions of the trans-
action (that 
Lincoln also will 




12/2/82 Elliotfs counter 1,660,000 Based upon assumption 
Exhibit 18 offer to of the underlying 
TransAmerica Properties first and second 
mortgages with a 
balance note of 11% 
12/17/82 TransAmerica Properties 1,750,000 required approval of 
Exhibit 19 the underlying lien 
holders 
1/7/83 TransAmerica 1,790,000 Subject to purchaser 
Exhibit 21 Properties consummating a 
loan, signed by 
Four Seasons 
Properties, J. F. 
Cannon 
The above sales all failed for one reason or another, 
mainly because Lincoln would not accept an assumption of the 
underlying 9% mortgage without increasing the rate to 15%. [T.34] 
The importance of this is well demonstrated by Healy, [T.117] and 
the rule of thumb that a change in interest rate of 1% is 
translated from $80,000 to $100,000 in the reduction of the value 
of $1,000,000. [T.125] A difference of 10% to 16%, which a 
purchaser would have to pay for their financing would reduce the 
purchase price of land and improvements 36% to 40% less. [T.126] 
4. In addition, Mr. Cannon and Four Seasons were 
doing all that they could to help the Trustee's sale of the 
property and were forwarding offers to Trustee. [T.158] 
5. After Healy acquired the property at a duly 
noticed sheriff's sale, he attempted to market the property to 
John Prince, the Stockbroker, [T.121] Gaddis Investment, Mansell 
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& Associates, Mark Milburn. [T.123] All of his attempts to 
market the property were unsuccessful. 
6. The offers received by Trustee ranged from 
$1,500,000.00 [open Exhibit No. 13-P] to $1,790,000.00. [Open 
Exhibit No. 21-P] 
7. Based upon the uncontradicted opinions of Healy 
and J. F. Cannon, the trial court found the fair market value of 
the property as of February 22, 1983, was $1,550,000.00. [T.125 
R. 1927] 
8. Hence, the value of the subject property on 
February 22, 1983, was less than the actual price that Four 
Seasons had sold the property to Frontier in November, 1979. 
This drop in the value of the subject property was due, in part, 
to a drastic increase in the interest rate between 1979 and 1982. 
Such increase results in corresponding reduction in the valuation 
of real property. [T.126] 
9. Confronted with the fact that no profit could be 
made through the sale of the subject property, in the face of a 
loss by his actions by assuming the land contract and in stalling 
and playing the market with the property, Trustee was faced with 
a loss. Trustee tried then to reject the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract, which he had previously assumed, by filing a motion in 
the Bankruptcy Court. [R.1929 Exhibit 36] There is no more 
appropos statement concerning the Trustee's action in this case 
than the one made by Judge Herbert Katz of the United States 
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Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of California, in his 
memorandum decision denying the Trustee's motion to reject the 
executory contract. It as in said decision that Judge Ktaz 
stated as follows: 
f,The trustee now argues that since he did not 
comply with §365(b)(1) as of the assumption date, 
January 22, 1982, he did not assume the contract. 
f!I cannot agree. . . . 
flThe long and short of it is that the trustee was 
offered an opportunity to a period of six months 
to try to market the property and cure the 
defaults, not at the time of acceptance, but from 
the proceeds of any sale. The trustee could not 
market the property. He gambled, and lost." 
On February 27, 1983, the parties stipulated that the 
balance due and owing by Frontier to Four Seasons under the 
uniform Real Estate Contract, was $1,749,950.32. [T.1929] The 
trial court found that on that date the subject property was 
encumbered in the amount of $1,504,817.88. [T.1929] The trial 
court concluded that Four Seasons1 loss of bargain was the 
difference between the stated amounts, i.e., $245,132.45. 
[T.1929 & 1931] This conclusion was based upon the manner in 
which Trustee had discharged his official duty, and upon the fact 
that Trustee was well aware of the time and place set for the 
sheriff's sale, Lincoln's demand that the interest rate be 
increased because of a provision in its note and mortgage, 
Trustee's desire to make a profit on the transaction and 
Trustee's failure to communicate offers to Four Seasons. 
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Four Seasons recognizes that the amounts relied upon by 
the trial court to arrive at the actual loss of bargain damages 
are not those amounts which this court has utilized in the 
above-cited cases. Nonetheless, it is hereby submitted that the 
judgment entered by the trial court accurately reflects the 
actual damages Four Seasons sustained as a result of Trustee's 
breach of contract. Therefore, the trial court's judgment should 
be affirmed. 
Trustee, in his brief, mistakenly attempts to bring 
this action within the purview of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
§57-1-32. [Appellant's Brief pp. 19-20] That section, however, 
provides a means to recover the balance due, following a sale of 
trust property, on an obligation for which a trust deed was given 
for security. The fallacy in this attempt by Trustee is that it 
ignores the fact that this is an action for breach of contract. 
Trustee had assumed the Uniform Real Estate Contract entered into 
by Four Seasons and Frontier. [R.1924] Trustee failed to cure 
all defaults within the time alloted by the bankruptcy court and 
later rejected said contract. This rejection constituted a 
breach of contract. [R.1930] But, since the property was sold to 
a third party, Four Seasons could not foreclose upon the subject 
property. Hence, the only remedy available to Four Seasons was 
an action for money damages. [R.1931] 
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POINT IV 
IN HIS BRIEF APPELLANT MAKES CERTAIN ARGUMENTS 
WHICH ARE MERE CONCLUSIONS AND WHICH ARE 
UNSuEEOfeTEb BY ANY EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD 
As stated above, this court has refused to disturb a 
trial court findings and judgment if such are supported by 
substantial evidence. Sine, supra. Despite this general rule, 
Trustee in his brief proposes several arguments that are nothing 
more than unsupported conclusions. [Appellant's brief, pp.14-23] 
Appellant first belabors the fact that Four Seasons 
controlled and manipulated the foreclosure process to the 
detriment of defendant. [Appellant's Brief p.14] Trustee 
testified, during the trial, that he knew of the sheriff!s sale. 
Trustee even "discussed the situation with (his) legal counsel." 
[R.160] There was no evidence presented by Trustee which would 
support his assertion that the foreclosure sale was controlled or 
manipulated by Four Seasons. If Trustee was even slightly 
concerned, he should have appeared at the time and place of the 
sale or should have arranged for someone to appear on his behalf. 
Trustee asserts that "upon obtaining the apartments 
from Healy, Cannons held as Trustee for plaintiff." [Appellant's 
brief p.17] This assertion is again contrary to the findings of 
the trial court and unsupported by any evidence in the record. 
Trustee states that because the Cannons were the 
general partners of Four Seasons, they had a fiduciary obligation 
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to give the partnership an opportunity to acquire the subject 
property. 
The general rule, however, is "that one must be 
personally adversely affected before he has standing to prosecute 
an action." Jenkins v. State, 585 P.2d 442-443 (1978). See also 
Shurtleff v. J. Tuft & Company, 622 P.2d 1168, 1172 (1980), 
wherein this court stated that a defendant has the right to have 
a cause of action prosecuted by the real party in interest to 
avoid further action on the same demand by another and to permit 
the defendant to assert the defenses and counterclaims available 
against a real owner of the cause. 
Applying this general rule to the instant case, it 
becomes obvious that Trustee is stretching to reach legal ground 
upon which to stand. However, the law, with few exceptions, 
allows only a real party in interest to prosecute his claim. In 
this case, Trustee lacks all standing to object to the Cannons 
acquisition of the subject property. If a claim does exist, it 
belongs to the limited partners, and Trustee should not be able, 
through the utilization of convoluted logic, to change the 
general rule of law. 
Finally, Trustee suggests that the trial court erred 
because it accepted Four Seasons credible evidence as to the fair 
market value of the subject property. To support this position, 
Trustee points to the deposition of Mr. J. F. Cannon to 
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demonstrate an inconsistency in Mr. Cannon's testimony at the 
trial. Four Seasons does not dispute the fact that Mr. Cannon's 
opinion as to the fair market value of the subject property 
varied from the date of his deposition, September 27, 1984, to 
the time of trial. At the time of the deposition, Mr. Cannon 
relied upon an appraisal which took into account the then 
existing 12% interest rate. [T.111-112] However, Mr. Cannon's 
opinion, which he rendered at the trial, that the subject 
property had a fair market value of $1,500,000.00 was based, in 
part, upon the fact that the interest rate had increased to 16%. 
[T.114] This significant increase in interest rates translates 
into $400,000.00 less than what the appraisal indicated. [T.112] 
Rule 32 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides, 
among other things, that the deposition may be used for the 
purpose of contradicting and impeaching the testimony of the 
deponent as a witness. But the deposition is not evidence. Mr. 
Cannon testified at the trial that in his opinion the subject 
property had the value of $1,500,000.00. [R.1927] This testimony 
was supported by other credible evidence, and as such fully 
supports the trial court's finding that the subject property had 




The trial court in this case has correctly held that 
Healy was not an agent of Four Seasons and that the benefits of 
the bargain is the proper measure of damages in a case involving 
a breach of a land sales contract. This holding is consistent 
with the long established and uniformly accepted rules of law. 
Furthermore, this holding is substantiated by the evidence in the 
record. Despite such evidence, and the rules of law, Trustee 
attempts to suggest that Healy was an agent of Four Seasons. Not 
only is this attempt unsupported by the evidence, it is also 
addressing a mute issue. In light of the bankruptcy court's 
order, which is quoted above, Trustee breached the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract. Hence, the only relevant issue was whether or 
not Four Seasons suffered any damages resulting from Trustee's 
breach. The trial court concluded that Four Seasons had suffered 
damages and entered an appropriate judgment. Four Seasons has 
shown that the findings and judgment of the trial court were 
predicated upon proper assumption of the facts which are 
supported by substantial evidence in the record. Four Seasons 
has also pointed out the mere, and totally unsupported, 
conclusions set forth in appellant's brief through which he urges 
this court to reverse the trial court's judgment. Thus, Trustee 
has failed to comply with the rigid standards of review set up by 
this court, and has failed to establish in this case the very 
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basic elements necessary for the reversal of the findings and 
judgment of the trial court. To grant the Trustee the relief he 
seeks by this appeal, under the circumstances shown by the 
evidence in the record, would in effect overrule the cases and 
law cited herein. The trial court's findings and judgment in 
this case should be affirmed, and Four Seasons should be awarded 
its costs incurred in this appeal. 
Dated this / ^ day of September, 1985. 
Thomas A. Duffin 
Counsel for Plaintiffy^efspondent 
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